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Introduction
As Hanslick himself tells us, his treatise On The Musically Beautiful contains both a positive thesis and a negative one.​[1]​ The positive thesis is concerned with what music is – the content of music consists solely of tonally moving forms, and musical beauty is of a special kind found only in music. The negative thesis is concerned with what music is not – distinct emotions are not part of the content of music, and nor are the feelings conveyed by the composer or the performer, or felt by the listener.  Curiously, the book has much more to say about the negative thesis than the positive one, and part of this paper will attempt to establish exactly why this should be so, and what consequences that imbalance has for Hanslick’s views about the nature of music. Moreover, it should be noted that we will follow (at least initially) the usual line here by tacitly implying that his arguments explore directly the issue of the “ontology” of music. Technically, however, they seem more to do with the identifying characteristics of music and the individuation of particular works, than with how music “exists” as an entity in the universe as it were. We will return to aspects of this issue in the final section.
   Hanslick approaches his positive thesis—what music actually is—by appealing to what he thought of as the methods of scientific investigation. However, what these methods eventually produced was a list of the ingredients of music that seems to be hopelessly disconnected and diverse. Some items are austerely reductionist in relation to the “content” of music (tones and forms alone), others oddly idealist in terms of the “substance” attributed to music (“substance” is a concept which appears miraculously only on the two final pages of his treatise), and the whole is somewhat under-theorized in terms of how a “sonic” object might be distinguished from a “musical” one, or how “beautiful” musical works might be distinguished from merely pleasant and well-crafted ones – which , after all, is how some might be tempted to describe Hanslick’s own surviving compositions.​[2]​
     Having created this ontological quagmire, Hanslick then makes various attempts within the treatise itself to reconnect with real musical experiences. He eventually suggests, for example, that the bonds between musical elements are not in fact open to scientific investigation,​[3]​ that the content of music can be grasped only musically never graphically,​[4]​ that performance coaxes an electric spark out of some “obscure secret place”,​[5]​ and that musical forms are filled rather than empty.​[6]​
   To understand what is happening here we need to take one or two steps backwards. After all, it is rather too easy to assume that Hanslick is writing his treatise as a philosopher in the modern sense, proceeding with a specific proof focused on his positive thesis. However, he does not quite do this since most of his actual “proofs” are in support of his negative thesis, and although his work contains commentaries upon philosophical notions—for example he alludes to the ideas of Vischer, Herbart, Zimmermann, Kant, Hegel, and others—we may doubt that these commentaries are Hanslick’s most important contribution to the subject. In the first place it seems likely that he took some of his central ideas from the philosopher Robert Zimmermann and the Prague journalist Bernhard Gutt.​[7]​ And secondly, there are some indications that Hanslick himself thought that his special contribution was likely to be his forensic skill in laying out the evidence, and his scientific objectivity in dealing with it. Thus we need to look at his legal and scientific agendas in this paper and their effects on his attempts to talk coherently about the ontology of music. When that is done, we can then turn to Hanslick’s own observations on musical experience and musical performance to see if they contain within them the seeds of a new approach to the ontology of music.  

Legal Methodologies
We should remember that when Dr. Hanslick wrote his treatise he was not a doctor of music, nor of philosophy as such, but of law. He obtained his doctorate in Vienna in 1849, immediately at the point at which he began his work on the subject of the musically beautiful. He was attached for a time to the “Landesgericht”—a Provincial Court or Assize Court—where he specialized in criminal law,​[8]​ and there are many references to legal concepts in Hanslick’s treatise, including his major statement on the status of evidence. He tells us that: “Apart from all interpretation, it is the work itself which is under consideration. And as the jurist pretends that whatever is not in the evidence is not in the world, so for aesthetic judgment nothing is available which is not in the work of art”.​[9]​
    This ground-rule for admissible evidence is not quite as helpful as it may seem, partly because it is easier to say what is materially relevant to a legal case than it is to control exactly what is encompassed within the limits of a work of art. After all, if what a musical work is stands “apart from all interpretation”, then that is going to make it rather hard to take into account all of the relevant aesthetic attributes of compositions such as Mozart’s Musical Joke, or those connected with irony, such as those found “in” some of the Shostakovich symphonies. And it is going to make it equally difficult to include among our legitimate aesthetic responses those that find their basis in the thrill of originality and innovative insight, since those qualities must rely (implicitly or explicitly) on historical comparison and tradition-critique for their full emergence and appreciation.
   Hanslick’s statement on juridical standards of evidence comes at the end of a sustained passage of argument (in Chapter 3) concerning what is to be analyzed in relation to the aesthetic effects of music, and how those things are to be analyzed. Curiously enough, those intense investigations seem to receive not so much scientific, as a quasi​​–legal, answers. The reason for this is that Hanslick makes it his business to focus on the causes of aesthetic effects, and those causes turn out to be so complex in relation to individual, particular responses to specific works, that no “universal”, one-stop scientific law could be found to cover all of the cases.  But this is to get ahead of the argument, and to appreciate the nature of the outcome we need to take a closer look at the contributing details. 
    Hanslick’s first attempt to discuss causation in relation to aesthetic effect is as follows:
 
     … the powerful effect of a theme comes not from the supposed augmentation of anguish in the composer but from this or that augmented interval, not from  the trembling of his  soul but  from the drumstrokes, not from his yearning but from the chromaticism.​[10]​


This is an interesting analysis since it excludes from the causal arena not only the composer’s feelings, but also anything from the personal, cultural or historical situation that might conceivably incline the musical events to be construed in one way rather than another.  A few pages later on Hanslick elaborates on this view:

To compare differences in world view between Bach, Mozart and Haydn and then go back to the differences between their compositions may count as a very attractive and meritorious exercise, yet it is infinitely complicated and will be more prone to fallacies,  the stricter the causal connection it seeks to establish.​[11]​
  
Clearly Hanslick knows that music has effects and he wants to know what causes them, but he does not want to know so much about their ultimate origins or their attendant webs of influence that he (and his methods) become overwhelmed and his judgments inconclusive. His solution to this dilemma is to stick to the technical features of music which, with deliberate care, he describes as the “proximate determining cause” (nächsten bestimmenden Ursache) of those effects.​[12]​ 
   This is an interesting moment in Hanslick’s argument. The term “proximate cause”—the cause closest to the effect—is a legal notion designed precisely to prevent judgments being overwhelmed by endless causal chains of circumstance. For example, if A shoots and injures B, then A’s action is what lawyers call the “cause-in-fact” of those injuries of B’s which result solely from the shooting. If, however, while being wheeled into hospital, B is stuck by lightning, A is not responsible for the additional injuries caused in that way (it is the lightning that is taken to be the “proximate cause” of those), despite the fact that B would not have been in that place but for A’s action.  In other words, in legal terms, the notion of proximate cause acts as a convenient limitation upon the standard tests for causes-in-fact – a proximate cause is deemed to be a new intervention that breaks an established causal chain.​[13]​
   Just how convenient for Hanslick’s argument this legal notion is, it is not hard to imagine. It allows him to concentrate on the immediately encountered sonic ingredients of what he can now refer to as “the music itself” in preference to what he characterizes as the more distant and therefore—as he submits in a quasi-legal way—irrelevant intentions of the composer, or the communications of the performer, or the culturally-informed preparedness that allows listeners to access and richly experience music of different kinds. Some have been ready to take this ‘ring-fencing” of particular types of cause to be equivalent to the empirical, focused objectivity striven for in scientific treatments of causation,​[14]​ but we should be more cautious. Not only is Hanslick’s notion of proximate cause essentially a legal and pragmatic one, but the process of applying it to the arts gives it a decidedly unscientific orientation. 
   The supporting arguments for this view are complex, but they can be briefly characterized with the aid of an example. When Isaac Newton (so the story goes) sat under his tree and was hit by an apple, he came up with some “universal” laws of gravitation which demonstrated (amongst other things) that smaller objects are attracted to larger ones.  However, if he had been attempting to demonstrate why that particular apple fell on his particular head in the particular year of 1666 in that particular location, he would still be at his calculations. This is because science cannot provide one-stop laws that explain the circumstantial “coming into being” of very particular complex events or effects.​[15]​ But these are precisely the types of explanation we have tended to seek in relation to artworks – we have traditionally been less interested in why human beings write symphonies in general, than (say) in whether Beethoven’s Eroica specifically bears the imprint of having been written in Vienna with the character of Napoleon in mind, because it is the latter question that seems the more likely to impinge upon our aesthetic pleasures and understanding. And for similar reasons we have been less interested to know why, in general, people feel emotions in relation to music (which may be an interesting psychological, biological or cultural question), than why a particular person X, feels a particular emotion Y, in the presence of a particular passage of music Z. 
   Unfortunately, such specific events arise, not from single causes, but from complex webs of causation, and we should not be surprised that science cannot provide “a single … law” ​[16]​ to cover them, even if that fact made Hanslick despair. On the other hand, we should be clear that the lack of a single covering law does not make the connection between music and emotion arbitrary or “unscientific”. It only means that (for us in our current state of knowledge) each such specific emotive effect is rather unpredictable. Moreover, the crucial point here is that the word “unpredictable” in that statement does not mean “undetermined” by scientific laws, it only means “complexly determined by many specific and interacting neurological, physiological, personal and cultural factors” only some of which we are fully able to understand or investigate. By contrast, legal theory, because of its need for everyday applicability to complex particular cases, cuts through this difficulty and comes up with compromise “laws” (they are actually “rulings”) that allow judgments to be made. But legal “laws” have an entirely different intent, status and effect from scientific ones, and by falling back on the severely restricted “proximate determining causes” familiar from the legal domain, Hanslick did not advance towards the general (“universal”) all-encompassing laws of science, but rather retreated from them. 
   It seems unlikely that Hanslick recognized this maneuver as a retreat, since later on in Chapter 3 he tells us that a philosophical foundation of music cannot be constructed until the connection between each musical element and its determinant [singular!] has been established. Moreover, to discover such connections he insists that a double approach is needed consisting of  “a strictly scientific framework and the most elaborate casuistics”.​[17]​   
   This is another interesting step in Hanslick’s “method”. Given his frequent appeals to science, the reference to a scientific framework is hardly surprising, but the use of the term “casuistics” (Kasuistik) is very intriguing. In its common usage “casuistry” is usually taken to be a derogatory term implying the kind of clever but false reasoning often associated with legal, moral or religious debates. It would be odd in the extreme were Hanslick to be openly using the word in that sense. It seems far more likely that he intended to use it rather in a technical sense to refer to a method of solving conflicts of principle on a case-by-case basis. (The root of the word is the Latin for “case”, cassus). This is certainly its normal application in the legal field, and Hanslick’s aesthetic treatise is unusual for the time for testing its philosophical ideas against a string of specifically identified musical “cases” – Beethoven’s Prometheus Overture;​[18]​ Gluck’s Che farò senza Euridice;​[19]​ Handel’s Messiah;​[20]​ and so on. There is, however, something interesting about the way in which uses his specific cases, and to understand exactly what that is we need to take a brief detour into the Austrian legal system. 
   When Hanslick trained as a lawyer the Austrian system had already benefited from the eighteenth-century reforms under Maria Theresa and the new codification of laws in the Allgemeine Bürgerliche Gesetzbuch of 1812. However, the basis of that system was still Roman Law. This was because jurists were trained in Catholic universities where Canon Law was at the centre of instruction, and Canon Law was essentially based on Roman Law. The impact of the Roman system on the German-speaking lands from the sixteenth century onwards did not so much modify their ancient laws as overwhelm them.​[21]​ For our purposes, however, the most important distinction between ancient Germanic law and Roman-Law systems lies in their respective attitudes to previous, similar legal cases. In the former (as in English Law) precedence was important, and earlier rulings would provide the mould, as it were, for judgments in exactly similar cases. There might be some discussion (some “descriptive interpretation” as it is sometimes called) concerning precisely what was intended by the wording of the original judgment, but the rule is to follow precedent whenever possible.​[22]​ By contrast, in systems based on Roman Law it is the laws and edicts which provided the only bedrock of judgments (not the individual case rulings), and it is specifically the job of jurists to apply them afresh to each new case.​[23]​ 
   We can perhaps see now how the Roman jurist system might relate to the organization of Hanslick’s treatise. When he assembles his string of specific music examples (Beethoven, Gluck, Handel, etc.), he is not doing it to establish a pattern, or to establish “case-law” in his judgments; rather he is attempting to test and apply his philosophical principles afresh to each varying case and examine each example on its own merits. And when he investigates previous discussions by known authorities (such as Spitta on Bach,​[24]​ or Rochlitz on Mozart​[25]​) he shows no sign of treating their judgments as guiding precedents. Indeed he does his best to discredit them as “witnesses” – a process, incidentally, which he later puts into reverse when assembling his list of “eminent people”​[26]​ who will be wheeled out to support his notion that music does not have a“content”. This indifference to constructing a case-law system with an emphasis on precedence, is exactly what one would expect from a lawyer trained in Austria at that time. 
   Also, there seems to be another reason why Hanslick is interested in testing his ideas on a succession of single-case investigations, and it is a crucial one for his theory. The attention to particular instances provides a useful way in which he can prevent notions of musical beauty being handed down from on high, as it were, from general theories of beauty applicable to all the arts. He tells us: “The subjectless formal beauty of music does not preclude its productions from bearing the imprint of individuality. The manner of  artistic treatment, like the invention of this or that particular theme, is in each case unique [my italics]: it can never be dissolved into a higher unity, but remains an individual”.​[27]​ This statement seems to be suggesting that, not only is there a specifically musical kind of beauty (an innovative claim long credited—perhaps wrongly—to Hanslick), but also that each beautiful musical work has its own particular type of beauty (a more interesting, problematic and under-explored assertion). Either way, as in the Austrian legal system, it is the general laws that must be tested anew in each case, rather than prior rulings being handed down to cover general classes of case by default.
   However, the legal dimension has a greater significance for Hanslick’s treatise than this, and to understand that significance we need to think about the difference between defending a philosophical premiss and defending a client in the criminal courts. The crucial point is this: in legal systems, the method of “proof” is not really to demonstrate that a defendant is by nature innocent—pure as the driven snow, as it were—rather it is to show that certain accusations are false, certain witnesses are incompetent or malicious, certain types of evidence are inadmissible, and that therefore the defendant is not guilty as charged (even though he or she might be guilty in some other respect). In other words the whole process is largely based on negative rebuttal, and a favorable verdict, should it come, is still cast in the form of “not guilty” rather than “entirely innocent”. This is precisely how Hanslick’s thesis, for the most part, is organized: it does not produce a complete set of arguments to establish exactly what music by nature is (though it makes some assertions), but rather focuses on demonstrating that the imputations of previous theorists as to its nature are false. In other words, Hanslick’s treatise proceeds exactly like a court-room drama, and that is what makes it so readable.
   This by no means exhausts the many references to legal practices in Hanslick’s book. We see, for example, that he also draws upon the notion of proximate cause to explain why, in those cases where music has a text, the text may seem to be the cause of the expression. He says: “Only in a logical (we almost said juridical) sense is the text the main thing and the music a mere accessory”.​[28]​ His point is that, although the text may be the immediate spur for the expression in the work, it is the musical ingredients that actually bring that expression directly into being; they are its true proximate cause. And his further (unstated) point seems to be that we need to treat the notion of proximate cause with subtlety in relation to aesthetic effects by drawing a distinction between mere instigation and actual production. (Had Hanslick fully grasped that distinction he might have extended it to highlight in a sophisticated way the differences between the causal effects of the musical ingredients of a work and the causal effects of its performances, as we shall see in the final section.) Continuing the legal theme, Hanslick also insinuates that the idea that there is a necessary link between particular passages of music and particular emotions has no more subtlety than a “police order”,​[29]​ and whenever he emphasizes the need for proof he seems to show a preference for using the verb beweisen or one of its cognates (invoking the notion that one has “to present legal evidence of a fact”) rather than, for example, erproben (“to put to the test”) or prüfen (“to prove”).​[30]​ But now it is time to turn to a more established source for Hanslick’s methodologies – the world of nineteenth-century science. 

Scientific Methodologies
Hanslick’s book opens with a sustained appeal to scientific methods. The most important aspect of this approach is that it allows him (at least at first) to characterize music as an “object” that can be examined dispassionately and empirically in relation to its material form alone – that is, aside from all feeling, or culture or presentational skill. He tells us that music is “first and foremost objective structure,”​[31]​ and it is this approach that leads most obviously to what some have called the “extreme formalism”​[32]​ of Hanslick’s views, notwithstanding the modicum of metaphysics that, for complicated reasons, he felt obliged to introduce. 
  In keeping with these views, Hanslick begins by telling us that we can only gain “objective” knowledge about music  by “getting alongside the thing itself”.​[33]​ There are many references in the treatise to the “music itself”, or some near equivalent,​[34]​ and Hanslick seems confident that music, as an object, can be observed neutrally in a manner that he describes as being “aside from all interpretation”​[35]​– that is, as if music were a scientifically definable object, rather like a piece of gold or a polar bear. 
   But it is unlikely that this approach will help matters. After all, gold and polar bears are what philosophers call “natural kinds”,​[36]​ the identities of which are determined by atomic or genetic structures, criteria open to independent standards of verification which guarantee their claims to be particular things. By contrast, music is what some philosophers call an “artificial kind” (such as a clock or a chess set), the identity or “being” of which is not directly defined by physical characteristics alone, but by contextually emergent sets of rules or functions or perceptions that govern its use – in other words by things that certainly cannot be read straight off the object itself. Science can enable us to distinguish between “gold” (a yellow precious metal) and “fool’s gold” (a yellowish iron pyrite) since, despite their similar appearances, the former is an element with the atomic number 79, and the latter is a mineral with the chemical formula FeS2. But we cannot confidently, or analogously, distinguish “music” from “fool’s music”, though some might feel that we can easily identify “music for fools”, which is a rather different matter since “music for fools” is, in some senses, still “music”.  
   At one point Hanslick himself clearly asserts that the laws governing music are not “natural” but rather arise from “culture”.​[37]​ But, nonetheless, he continues to insist that his scientific examination of music will be done only with “objective data”, never with a supposed “state of mind”,​[38]​ and he emphasizes that we should recognize that “the laws of beauty proper to each particular art are inseparable from its distinct material and technique”.​[39]​
   The references to  “material” and “technique” here are interesting. They are—it seems to Hanslick (at least initially)—directly observable, and verifiable as being part of the artwork itself and therefore admissible as evidence. Indeed they are the chief means by which he attempts to maintain the notion that music is simply an “object”. However, as the book progresses many concepts that were treated initially as concrete pieces of empirical data—“material”, “form”, “melody”, etc.—gradually acquire metaphysical attributes. This seems to be part of a developing attempt to include within the work aesthetic and spiritual characteristics which, it becomes apparent, are gradually seen as necessary to distinguish artworks from sonic structures, real music from mere notational schemes and beautiful music from trivial music.  
   Many of the concepts that Hanslick introduces to effect the metaphysical turn of his treatise—“idea”, substance”, “form”, etc.—had already accrued complex pedigrees within the German philosophical tradition.  Recently, several illuminating studies have appeared which attempt to situate the treatise among, for example, the ideas of Ludwig Feuerbach and the Young Hegelians, or the gathering skepticism towards Idealist philosophy, or the new scientific viewpoints as exemplified by Ludwig Büchner’s widely-read Kraft und Stoff, published in 1855, which championed a kind of mechanical materialism (and which provoked an intense campaign against “vulgar” materialism from Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels amongst others).​[40]​ In parallel with these investigations much attention has been paid to the final paragraph of the first edition of Vom Musikalisch-Schönen (removed from later versions) which reveals rather too blatantly that Hanslick has failed to free himself from a metaphysical backdrop in spite of his adoption of new scientific methods. In his final, excised paragraph Hanslick tells us that the spiritual content of music combines in the soul of the listener with all other great and beautiful ideas, and through deep and secret relationships to nature, the meaning of tones allows us to feel the infinite even as we listen to the work of human talent.​[41]​ The crucial imputation of remarks such as these is that music is not only organizationally, but somehow mysteriously different from mere sound ​ ​– and the fact that musicians and theorists have been nervous of loosing that imputation perhaps accounts for some of the philosophical difficulties that we, together with Hanslick, have found ourselves in.
   Interesting as recent studies have been in documenting and exposing Hanslick’s own views as to what he thought the contemporary challenges were, they rarely chart the exact philosophical confusions that impede his theories as to the ingredients of music. Take, for example, the notion of “material”. It begins in Chapter 1 as something observable and subject to “research”.​[42]​ In Chapter 3 we are told that in music the concept of form is “materialized”,​[43]​ and we are later assured that this same musical form consists of “concrete tonal structures” (concreten Tonbildungen).​[44]​ But in Chapter 4 we find a more ambitious version of “material” in play specifically in relation to “tones”, since we read that the ideas of the composer are made manifest in “The limitlessly expressive ideal material [geistige Stoff] of the tones”​[45]​ – a sentence which is likely to give an empirical scientist a headache. Moreover, it is not easy to discover how this material gets these extra meanings into the tones, or even exactly how “tones” acquire their musical qualities. The following passage, for example, comes in Chapter 6, and appears thus in Payzant’s translation :

         …we receive from mother nature only material for material; this latter is the pure, measurable tone, determined according to height and depth of pitch. It is the prime and indispensable requisite of all music. It forms itself [my italics] into harmony and melody, which are the two principal factors of music​[46]​

From this description we glean that nature provides sounds (“material for material”), which then mysteriously become tones (musical material), which then mysteriously form themselves into melody and harmony, which (as we have been told), are the proximate causes of what we experience in relation to music. In fact the German of the final sentence​[47]​—“Diese gestaltet ihn zu Melodie und Harmonie den zwei Hauptfactoren der Tonkunst“—makes Hanslick’s thoughts a little clearer because the word “diese” (feminine) suggests that it is referring back to the feminine noun “Musik” in the previous sentence, and so it is music that transforms tones into harmony and melody, and not the tones themselves in virtue of some mysterious self-reflexive activity of their own. Even so, this produces a peculiar kind of tautology where music (as a mysterious active agent) itself produces harmony and melody out of tones, which therefore suggests that tones are both musical and not quite fully musical until that transforming operation of “music” has taken place. Moreover, this is not quite the end of the story since the sentence following the quotation tells us that it is not “music” that has transformed tones into melody and harmony after all; rather these last two “are creations of the human spirit.”
   As with much (semi-)Idealist writing, it might be possible to construct a system of thought in which Hanslick’s various opaque notions could find an “implicative” function, but it seems unlikely that that would help much to clear the fog that lies just below the surface. What Hanslick is doing here and elsewhere is gradually assimilating metaphysical attributes to empirical ones in an aesthetic maneuver he seems to think of as “embodiment” (Verkörperung)​[48]​ – a catch-all term frequently found in aesthetic writings, but which has almost no explanatory force, and which often seems to combine the physical and metaphysical in ways as puzzling as the mind-body problem.​[49]​ After all, “embodiment”, despite is corporeal associations, is ultimately a metaphysical concept, so it is no wonder that Hanslick fairly quickly gives up attempting to unite the physical and metaphysical aspects into a coherent theory of ontology. As early as Chapter 3 he simply resigns himself to saying: “despite the inscrutableness of the ultimate ontological grounds, there is a multitude of proximate causes [“näherliegender Ursachen” – the word “näherliegender” was added in the 1874 edition] with which the ideal expression of a piece of music is in precise correlation”.​[50]​ 
   What is clear is that Hanslick’s ontology of music begins to fall between several different stools. He cannot take account of musical emotions or variable cultural understandings of music because he cannot directly observe them or formulate general laws about them. He cannot include the effects of musical performance because they are too unpredictable and subjective, and therefore cannot be part of a fixed object. And he cannot rely just on empirical descriptions of tones and structures for, as he says, they “follow laws entirely different in their artistic application from the laws of their effects as isolated phenomena”.​[51]​  What then is to be done? One possible way forward is to look not at what Hanslick has to say about the content and identity of music, but at what he implies about the ‘musicness’ of music, especially in his odd remarks about performance. In the final section I shall briefly attempt to sketch a new approach to the ontology of music based on remarks from within Hanslick’s treatise itself.

The ‘musicness’ of music
For much of the treatise Hanslick is so busy treating compositions as scientific objects that only in passing does he comment upon the nature of what we might call their “musicness”.  This hesitation is perhaps understandable for someone trying to use scientific methods to capture the essence of music. After all, even western notated musical scores contain instructions that leave an unsettling element of freedom for the performer (cadenza, espressivo, rubato, etc.) alongside those that do not (certain pitch and rhythm indications for example). Additionally, it is normative in western performance traditions for performers to impose their own, sometimes unique, patterns of emphasis and intensity on the work in what we refer to as “interpretations”. 
   As Hanslick sensed, two particular ontological difficulties arise from this complex situation. The first is how we going to link the variations that arise in performance with a concept of the fixed identity of the artwork. The second is how we are going to claim that the aesthetic qualities displayed through the performance are indeed those of the artwork and not merely those of the (perhaps uniquely whimsical ) performance. These are deep questions and all that can be done here is to use the hints that are already present in Hanslick’s treatise to sketch out (somewhat speculatively) a possible reconfiguration of the issues for further investigation. 
    What we find throughout Hanslick’s argument is that he is anxious to protect himself from the endless possibilities of variation in performance and listener response by fixing all relevant meanings within the tones themselves. To achieve this, as we have seen, he falls back on the notion of some kind of embodiment: “the impression of feeling inheres in the physical substratum of the tones”.​[52]​ And if we should ask exactly how we might gain access to these embodied elements contained “in” the tones, Hanslick explains that “the content of a musical work can be grasped only musically, never graphically: i.e., as that which is actually sounding in each piece” (my italics).​[53]​ 
   This is a rather interesting formulation, and it is one that is clearly mirrored in his journalist musical criticism. For example, he says of Wagner’s Rienzi and The Flying Dutchman that they should not be judged by “the mere study of cold notes”, for such a study “can receive its ultimate completion and confirmation only through the actual sensual conception”, and that, furthermore, the critic “may, on other occasions, in actual performance, often recognize as mere paper effect something that had struck him as particularly promising in his study”.​[54]​ In other words, it is performance that seems, in Hanslick’s system, to do the work of “embodiment”, conjuring up the metaphysical out of the physical. At one point he even goes so far as to tell us that performance is in any case essential from the beginning of the artistic endeavor: “an inner singing, not a mere inner feeling, induces the musically gifted person to construct a musical artwork”.​[55]​ In fact it is hard to avoid the impression that what we might call a “performance postulate” underpins much of his work. Whenever Hanslick is analyzing the inner content of music he also seems, by aesthetic default, to be calling to mind a real or imagined performance.​[56]​
   These constant references to latent performance should give us pause, but we will then need to consider exactly how we might theorize performances within the work-concept. Most attempts to do this run into the difficulty that it seems to be impossible to integrate the fixed identity of the work with the variable identities of the resultant sound-structures – and, moreover, the former have an inconvenient tendency to possess aesthetic attributes that the latter cannot easily acquire (works can be “Liszt-influenced”, for example, in a way that performances of them rarely are).​[57]​ There has been a recent move to circumvent these issues by characterizing the musical work as a “script” (after the theatrical model) rather than as a “text”.​[58]​ But although this formulation captures the open-endedness of performances, it does not explain how actual performances could be the most important signifiers of the identity of the work. For one thing, there is the uneasy implication that the work does not exist as a clear entity until all the performances are known ​​– but what then happens if some performances actually contradict others, or if the final performance is cancelled?​[59]​ And for another, there is a difficulty about saying that these performances are displaying “interpretations” at all, since it would be rather difficult to say what they were interpretations “of”, if the identity of the work was not fixed until the final performance had taken place. In other words, the problem of fixing the artistic identity of a written score has simply been transferred (without much benefit) to the problem of fixing the identity of the “relevant” class of performances, and we cannot easily say what “relevant” means in this situation without falling back on some shadowy prior notion of the ‘work itself’, whuch the whole sytem is designed to exclude.
      It seems possible that these problems will always arise when we attempt to link performance only to the issue of the specific identity of works, rather than to the type of artefactuality (and concomitant experience) that the category of “music” implies. Hanslick’s treatise, notwithstanding its metaphysical contortions, amounts to an ongoing demonstration that attempts to compress the essence of  “music” into the essence of “the identity of a specific work” is bound to lead to trouble. This is because one can imagine that it would be possible to define the uniqueness of a notated page or an intended soundscape by mere description (as it were), as if they were not really artworks at all – as if they were respectively (say) no more than an eccentric type of wallpaper, and a specially contrived sonic signaling device. An alien visitor from space might easily pick up their uniqueness without knowing that they were music, or without knowing what music was. Even for us, such a process of identity-definition cannot confirm their membership of the category “music” without some (real or imagined) demonstration that the appropriate attributes of musical performance (meaningful phrasing, coherent patterns of intensity, and so on) could arise from engagement with those objects. 
    If Hanslick had separated the conditions of unique identity from the “musical-in-nature” condition of the general kind of object we take a work to be, he might then have been able to make some headway with the two ontological problems mentioned at the beginning of this section. Firstly, variations in performance could be accommodated theoretically because the ways of turning a set of notes into a generic thing called “music” are infinitely more varied than the ways of conveying the identity of a particular piece. And secondly, such a move would have absolved him from the burden of having to demonstrate that all the relevant aesthetic qualities of the performance must, in some sense, be sanctioned by the artwork “itself” – and he would no longer have to claim that performance was the mere “reproduction of a musical work” as he put it.​[60]​ Of course a specific musical composition, as a “strategy” for producing aesthetic experiences, would still control those qualities associated solely with the work ​– the unique structure, the harmonic rhythm, the specific melodic shapes and other such ingredients made manifest in performance. In that controlling sense the initiating strategy (the score, the scheme of notes) is potentially an artwork. But a second set of attributes—more general aesthetic qualities—still needs to be contributed by the performance in the service of “musicness”. And, as we know, performances employ a varied range of techniques to evoke the generic type “music”, since in that facet of their activity they only have to be faithful to the type, not the particular work.​[61]​ There are many ways in which one can give the impression that something is music, but only a few in which one can confirm that something is a particular, identifiable work.
    Hanslick’s text on several occasions suggests that he is struggling to make this distinction between the describable ingredients of a specific work and the generalized uplifting artistic and musical attributes. In his central treatment of musical beauty (Chapter 3), for example, he felt constrained to say that: “What makes a piece of music a work of art and raises it above the level of physical experiment is something spontaneous, spiritual and therefore incalculable”.​[62]​ Again,  in Chapter 4, his remarks oscillate somewhat unnervingly between insisting that the composed work is “the completed artwork” of which the performance is mere “reproduction”,​[63]​ and telling us that the real “moment of fulfillment” occurs in performance, since the “reproductive act … coaxes the electric spark out of its obscure secret place and flashes it across to the listener”.​[64]​ 
   These attempts to compress the attributes of musicality into those of specific identity seem to lie at the heart of his tendency to fall back on the opaque notion of “embodiment” – and given his historical situation he was almost bound to construe that notion in Idealist terms. Moreover, Hanslick was more interested in musicality than identity, and that is another reason why his book is so lopsided: it has much more to say about all of those things (emotional expression, the distracting charm of melodies, the appropriate representation of texts, etc.) that were not, according to his ontological theory, “in” the work, than those that were. It is only to be regretted that he did not fully theorize the role of performance and its task of transforming an inanimate schematic (“scientific”) notational object into a valuable musical experience, though he clearly alluded to that role in many different ways. Even within the terms that Hanslick does discuss it, music seems to require a special double type of ontological treatment—one for the work, and another for the ‘musicness”—which would be incompatible with models derived from science or the law.  This is because science and the law tend to be concerned with causes of events, not reactions to events. The Morning Star and the Evening Star may elicit different responses from us, but science is interested in their single cause (the planet Venus); and in law, the injured victim and the perpetrator may arouse distinct emotions and sympathies, and yet still (in cases of negligence for example) arise from the same person, the same legal  “cause-in-fact”. By contrast, “musicness” is not a cause, but a response to an initiating cause (the schematic work), and a response which has its own further causes (grounded in cultural, intellectual and emotional understanding) beyond the reach of the specific work. Hanslick’s heroic attempts to assert that these two types of cause are in fact the same one have a lot to answer for, not only in terms of his theory, but historically, in terms of the ways in which we have construed the artform of music ever since. 
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